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INTRODUCTION 
As lawyers, judges and legal educators, we think of ourselves as rational 
actors.1 The predominant discourse in law school and amongst lawyers is that 
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I thank Kendall Kerew, Natsu 
Saito, and Ryan Young for their thoughtful comments and edits on earlier drafts. I also thank 
Pam Brannon and the GSU law librarians for their invaluable research assistance. 
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lawyers are the ultimate rational thinkers.2 We train law students to “think like 
lawyers” which presumably includes setting aside any existing biases or preju-
dices and thinking rationally, logically, and analytically.3 
An earlier paper discusses the need to help law students understand that 
“thinking like lawyers” requires that they become culturally sensible lawyers—
lawyers who understand that we all have multifaceted cultural backgrounds, 
experiences, and biases that affect how we perceive and analyze legal problems 
and how we interact with clients and colleagues.4 This understanding requires 
students to grapple with their own biases and stereotypes,5 as well as the influ-
ence cultural factors and systemic racism have had, and continue to have, upon 
the U.S. legal system.6 While racial categories are artificial constructs,7 there is 
                                                                                                                                
1  Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and 
Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 236 (2005) (“Lawyers prefer to see themselves 
as keenly rational thinkers, and negotiators as practitioners of a science with hard skills and 
identifiable principles.”). 
2  Graham B. Strong, The Lawyer’s Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the Practice of 
Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 759, 761 (1998) (“Although the phrase ‘thinking like a lawyer’ 
may be more talismanic than descriptive, it is above all else associated with a logical, analyt-
ical style of thought.” (footnote omitted)). 
3  Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”: Toward 
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1777 (1993) (“The prevailing image 
of the law is of blindfolded Justice balancing the scales of decision. Because lack of bias or 
prejudice is essential to adjudication, Justice wears a blindfold to shut out persons and pas-
sions that might inappropriately influence her inward deliberation. Even where lawyers are 
advocates or advisors rather than adjudicators, the profession emphasizes ‘thinking like a 
lawyer.’ The phrase celebrates thought that is incisively rational, logical, analytical, and es-
pecially, dispassionate.”). 
4  Andrea A. Curcio, Teresa E. Ward & Nisha Dogra, A Survey Instrument to Develop, Tai-
lor, and Help Measure Law Student Cultural Diversity Education Learning Outcomes, 38 
NOVA L. REV. 177 (2014) [hereinafter Curcio et al., Survey Instrument]. 
5  See infra Part II (discussing the need for students to understand their own biases and the 
barriers those biases may present to effective lawyering). 
6  Deborah N. Archer, There Is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of Teaching the Next Gener-
ation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a “Post-Racial” Society, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 55 (2013) 
(discussing how, while students have become more aware of the need to understand the role 
various cultural factors may play in the lawyering process, they have simultaneously become 
more resistant to acknowledging that institutional and structural racism results in continuing 
societal racial disparities—disparities students must recognize in order to provide effective 
client representation); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on 
the Impact and Origins of “The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection”, 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 
965–77 (2008) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited] (discussing how his-
torical racial subordination continues to influence legal analysis and power structures, and 
arguing that while there is value in the work done to identify the psychological mechanisms 
underlying individual’s unconscious biases, that work may obscure the need to take both 
moral and legal collective responsibility to affirmatively remedy the effects of, and disestab-
lish the institutional embodiments of, white supremacy). For a discussion of the role race has 
played and continues to play in the development of U.S. laws, see generally DERRICK  BELL, 
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF 
FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996). 
On the use of equal protection theory to maintain racial subordination, see Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 637–54. 
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a long and ongoing history of real differences in the treatment and, therefore, 
collective experiences of “racial” groups.8 Those experiences influence how we 
perceive and assess facts, attitudes, legal problems, and legal processes.9 De-
spite the different experiences resulting from people’s racial, ethnic, or cultural 
backgrounds,10 there is a pervasive belief within legal education as well as 
amongst the bench and bar that legal analysis involves assessing an “objective 
reality,”11 and what counts as “objective” is almost always perceived through 
the lens of white peoples’ experiences and privileges.12 
                                                                                                                                
7  See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 
(1994). On the role of law in this process, see generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: 
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. & updated ed. 2006); see also Angela P. Harris, 
Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 207, 211–13 
(1995) (noting that “strategic essentialism” allows racial identity to become a marker of his-
toric wrongs and struggles for political recognition). As Professor Harris observes “ ‘race’ is 
neither a natural fact simply there in ‘reality,’ nor a wrong idea, eradicable by an act of will. 
‘Race’ is real, and pervasive: our very perceptions of the world . . . are filtered through a 
screen of ‘race.’ ” Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 
CALIF. L. REV. 741, 774 (1994). 
8  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE  
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Society of American Law Teachers,  
Racial Discrimination in the Legal Profession (June 30, 2014), available at  
http://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/June-30-SALT-FINAL-to-CERD-2.pdf. 
9  See, e.g., MARK PEFFLY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF 
BLACKS AND WHITES 28–67 (2010) (discussing survey results that demonstrate different ex-
periences of the justice system based upon one’s race and ethnicity); Jay C. Carlisle, Synop-
sis of the Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in 
the Courts, 19 PACE L. REV. 431 (1999) (describing how white peoples’ experiences of legal 
problems, legal processes, and interactions within the justice system differed from the expe-
riences of people of color); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Greñas: 
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 1, 18–26 (1994) (discussing her experience as a Latina law student). 
10  Culture is multi-faceted and all people have multiple cultural experiences and back-
grounds that influence perceptions and behaviors. Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra 
note 4, at 184. Moreover, one cannot assume that people from similar cultural backgrounds 
have the same beliefs or perspectives. Id.; see also Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & 
Carwina Weng, Challenges of “Sameness”: Pitfalls and Benefits to Assumed Connections in 
Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 339 (2012) (discussing the need to be aware of assumptions 
of “sameness”). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Essay, Paths to Belonging: The Constitu-
tion and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 303 (1986) (discussing the United States as a 
multicultural society in which cultural differences have long been regarded with distrust). 
11  See Margaret Montoya & Christine Zuni Cruz, interviewed by Gene Grant, Narrative 
Braids: Performing Racial Literacy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 158–61 (2009) (discussing 
“objectivity” in legal education). 
12  See generally Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 245 (2005). See also BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE 
RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998) (discussing the prerogative of white people not 
to see race) ; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (ana-
lyzing the evolution of a perceived property interest in white racial identity); John A. Powell, 
Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419 
(2000) (discussing whiteness as the “universal norm”). On the impact this has on people of 
color, see generally Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Cen-
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Two surveys of law students13 suggest that law students may believe that 
legal “objectivity” and legal training in rational and analytical thinking makes 
lawyers less susceptible than others, and especially less susceptible than clients, 
to having, or acting upon, stereotypes or biases.14 The survey results suggest 
that law students may think legal training somehow immunizes lawyers from 
viewing legal problems and clients through their own cultural lenses, and from 
having cultural biases that affect their analyses and interactions. And, to the ex-
tent they have biases or stereotypes, law students also believe they generally 
are able to recognize those beliefs, and can identify when they are acting upon 
them. Social cognition theory forces law students (and law professors, lawyers, 
and judges) to confront the fallacy of those beliefs, as social cognition studies 
demonstrate that stereotypes and biases affect most people’s perceptions and 
interactions.15 Social cognition theory also helps explain resistance to admitting 
biases—a resistance that exists at individual16 and societal levels.17 
Social cognition theory helps us recognize that our legal training does not 
immunize us against biases. As Professor Carwina Weng explained nearly a 
decade ago, social cognition theory provides legal educators a way to help stu-
dents understand the role cultural biases may play in their own interactions, as 
well as in the legal process.18 Additionally, because social cognition theory is 
grounded in scientific theory, explaining the psychology underlying biases may 
appeal to students’ interests in developing their rational and analytical thinking 
and thus make them more receptive to learning about, and confronting, their 
own stereotypes and biases. 
This symposium piece discusses results from two validated law student 
surveys about the role culture plays in the work lawyers perform, how those re-
sults relate to social cognition theory, and what the survey results and social 
cognition theory suggest for legal educators, lawyers and judges in terms of 
improving our abilities to work effectively across cultures. While much of this 
article talks about educating students, the principles and theories discussed of-
ten apply equally to educating ourselves. 
                                                                                                                                
trifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 263 (2000). 
13  The initial survey is discussed in Andrea A. Curcio, Teresa M. Ward & Nisha Dogra, Ed-
ucating Culturally Sensible Lawyers: A Study of Student Attitudes About the Role Culture 
Plays in the Lawyering Process, 16 UNIV. W. SYDNEY L. REV. 98 (2012) [hereinafter Curcio 
et al., Student Attitudes]. The second survey is discussed in Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, 
supra note 4. 
14  See infra Tables 1, 2, 5. 
15  See infra Part II. 
16  See infra Parts II, III. 
17  Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6, at 931 (discussing how the focus 
on individual’s unconscious racism may obscure the bigger issue: that racism is a societal 
problem that should be addressed via collective responsibility and action). 
18  Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-
Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005) (discussing why exposure to social cognition 
theory could help develop students’ abilities to work effectively across cultures). 
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Part I discusses the survey results which indicate law students believe that 
they, and lawyers generally, are less likely than others to view the law and legal 
problems through a culturally biased lens. It also sets out survey data that sug-
gest law students believe they are fairly adept at identifying when stereotypes 
or biases potentially affect their conduct or analysis. Part II explores the social 
cognition theory literature that suggests self-reports of bias are inaccurate be-
cause of the power of implicit (hidden) biases that operate on a largely uncon-
scious level, and explains how the survey results are consistent with that litera-
ture. It also provides an overview of some studies that demonstrate how 
implicit bias may affect the lawyering process, to illustrate why it is critical that 
lawyers understand the cultural lenses and biases through which we all operate. 
Part III reviews social cognition theory as it relates to understanding our re-
sistance to admitting that we have, and act upon, biases. Part IV discusses how 
legal educators may use social cognition theory as the cornerstone of a program 
of legal education that recognizes the need to infuse the curriculum with an 
awareness of the role culture plays in the lawyering process. 
I. SURVEY RESULTS 
To help legal educators “assess the need for cultural competence education 
and to inform the discussion of what that education might encompass,”19 we20 
developed a “cultural sensibility survey” instrument. This development oc-
curred in two phases. An initial instrument, administered to 125 incoming law 
students and 13 upper level clinic students, used a five-point semantic differen-
tial response scale21 (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree), and it con-
tained a series of open-ended questions.22 That initial survey instrument (“Sur-
vey 1”) reached a sufficient level of sample adequacy (Kaiser-Meyer Olkin 
Measure = .713).23 However, based upon student feedback in the open-ended 
questions, we believed the instrument could be improved. Using that feedback, 
as well as feedback from focus groups and expert reviews, we developed a sec-
ond instrument that was administered to 591 incoming and upper level students 
at two different schools (“Survey 2”). That instrument used a six-point seman-
                                                        
19  Curcio et al., Student Attitudes, supra note 13, at 98. 
20  The survey development work was done in collaboration with Dr. Teresa M. Ward and 
Dr. Nisha Dogra. 
21  A semantic differential response scale measures people’s reactions to words or concepts 
using a scale with opposing adjectives or descriptors, such as agree/disagree, on either end of 
the scale. DAVID R. HEISE, The Semantic Differential and Attitude Research, in ATTITUDE 
MEASUREMENT 235 (Gene F. Summers ed., 1970). 
22  Curcio et al., Student Attitudes, supra note 13, at 107. 
23  Id. at 108. For a detailed description of the statistical analysis, see id. at 110–11. 
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tic differential response scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree),24 
and had a reliability alpha of .842.25 
In both surveys, law students were asked questions that sought information 
about whether they believed that they held culturally biased views that affected 
their perceptions and interactions. This article looks specifically at certain ques-
tions or subsets of questions from both surveys.26 The survey results set forth 
below lay the foundation for the discussion of the interplay between social cog-
nition theory and developing future lawyers’ understanding that, despite being 
trained in rational thinking, they are still likely to be subject to unconscious bi-
ases that influence their perceptions and conduct. 
As the data in Table 1 illustrate, 589 law student respondents thought law-
yers are less likely than clients, and somewhat less likely than judges, to look at 
legal problems through their own cultural lens. Students were even less likely 
to think that they, personally, viewed the legal system through a culturally bi-
ased lens. 
TABLE 1: WHO LOOKS AT LEGAL PROBLEMS THROUGH A CULTURAL LENS27 
Survey Items Mean28 SD 
Clients look at legal problems through their own cultural lens. 5.09 0.97 
Judges do not look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.29 4.65 1.23 
Lawyers look at legal problems through their own cultural lens. 4.01 1.29 
I do not view the legal system through a culturally biased lens.30 3.86 1.37 
As shown in Table 2, students also believed there was a difference in how 
likely one’s cultural background was to influence lawyer/client communica-
                                                        
24  The six-point differential scale was to control for a perceived neutral mid-point. Curcio et 
al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at 210 (there were no descriptive terms beyond 
1 = strongly disagree and 6 = strongly agree). 
25  Id. at 211. For a more detailed breakdown of the statistical analysis performed, see id. at 
211–14. 
26  In Survey 2, we compared responses between upper level and incoming students; students 
from the two different schools participating in the survey; white and non-white students, and 
men and women. Id. at 236–47, apps. B–E. While the mean score answers to most items 
were generally identical as between all sub-divided cohorts, occasionally there was a 0.01 
difference in the mean for a particular item. See id. The tables here present data as divided 
between the two schools. See id. at app. C at 239–41. 
27  Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 236–37. 
28  1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 588–590. 
29  Reverse coded. When questions are written in the negative, in order to correlate answers 
with questions that are written in the positive, the answers to the question worded in the neg-
ative are “reverse coded”—i.e. a response of “1” [strongly disagree] is coded as if it was a 
“6” [strongly agree]; a 2 is coded as if it was a 5, etc. For a more detailed explanation of  
why and how to reverse code survey items, see Karen Grace-Martin, An Easy Way to  
Reverse Code Scale Items, THE ANALYSIS FACTOR, http://www.theanalysisfactor.com 
/easy-reverse-code/ (last visited May 3, 2015). 
30  Reverse coded. See supra note 29. 
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tions. While students recognized that communication within the lawyer/client 
relationship was influenced by both the lawyer’s and the client’s cultural back-
grounds, students found it more likely that the client’s communications were 
influenced by their cultural backgrounds. 
TABLE 2: IMPACT OF CULTURE ON LAWYER/CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS31 
Survey Items Mean32 SD 
How a client communicates with his or her lawyer is not influenced by 
the client’s cultural background.33 
5.19 1.04 
How a lawyer communicates with his or her client is not influenced by 
the lawyer’s cultural background.34 
4.67 0.99 
When asked if lawyers brought culturally biased assumptions into the law-
yer/client relationship, students, on average, tended to think they did not.  
TABLE 3: BRINGING CULTURALLY BIASED ASSUMPTIONS  
INTO THE LAWYER/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP35 
Survey Items Mean36 SD 
Lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities bring culturally bi-
ased assumptions into the lawyer-client relationship. 
3.42 1.34 
White lawyers bring culturally biased assumptions into the law-
yer/client relationship. 
3.57 1.50 
We also asked students about themselves. As Table 4 indicates, students 
believed, on average, that they could recognize when they were reacting based 
upon culturally biased assumptions and stereotypes. 
TABLE 4: ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE OWN BIASES37 
Survey Items Mean38 SD 
In general, I can accurately identify my culturally biased assumptions 
about others who are from cultures different from my own. 
4.20 1.04 
In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are 
based on stereotypical beliefs. 
4.61 0.91 
                                                        
31  Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 236–37. 
32  1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 589–590. 
33  Reverse coded. See supra note 29. 
34  Reverse coded. See supra note 29. 
35  Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 238. 
36  1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 589–590. 
37  Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 237–38. 
38  1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 587. 
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Finally, in the initial survey, students were asked about their own abilities 
to identify when they were acting based upon culturally biased assumptions and 
stereotypical beliefs and about others’ abilities to do so. Students felt fairly 
confident that they could identify when they were acting based upon stereo-
types or culturally biased assumptions. Using a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree), in response to the statement: “In general, I am able to rec-
ognize when my reactions to others are based on stereotypical beliefs,” approx-
imately 5 percent of the 137 respondents selected numbers 1 or 2 while 73 per-
cent chose either number 4 or 5.39 In response to the statement, “In general, I 
can accurately identify my culturally biased assumptions about others who are 
from different racial/ethnic/cultural backgrounds,” no students chose number 1 
(strongly disagree) and only 3.7 percent of the respondents selected the number 
2, while 64 percent chose number 4 and 8 percent selected number 5.40 Stu-
dents not only felt that they could generally identify when their reactions were 
based on stereotypical beliefs or culturally biased assumptions, they also felt 
they were much better than others when it comes to recognizing when biases 
and stereotypes affected their conduct or judgment. 
TABLE 5: SELF V. OTHERS41 
Survey Items Mean42 SD 
Most people are unable to recognize when their reactions to other 
people are based on stereotypical beliefs 
3.22 0.92 
In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are 
based on stereotypical beliefs 
3.83 0.80 
Most people cannot accurately identify their culturally biased assump-
tions about others who are from different racial/ethnic/cultural back-
grounds 
3.09 0.87 
In general, I can accurately identify my culturally-biased assumptions 
about others who are from different racial/ethnic/cultural backgrounds 
3.76 0.65 
The survey results set forth above are consistent with studies that suggest 
that people have a “bias blind spot” (we can see bias in others but not our-
selves).43 While it is not surprising that law students have the same “bias blind 
spot” as others, what has not previously been identified is that this “bias blind 
spot” extends to law students’ views about lawyers versus clients.44 It is unclear 
                                                        
39  Curcio et al., Student Attitudes, supra note 13, at app. B at 126, tbl.2. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. These questions were asked only in Survey 1. The comparison of self to other ques-
tions were eliminated from Survey 2 both because we wanted Survey 2 to focus on students’ 
self-assessments rather than comparisons, and because we wanted to keep Survey 2 as short 
as possible. 
42  1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. n = 136–138. 
43  See infra Part III.A (discussing bias blind spot). 
44  See supra Tables 1, 2. 
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whether the reason students think lawyers are less likely than their clients to be 
influenced by their cultural backgrounds is because students see themselves as 
future lawyers and thus the results are simply an extension of the “bias blind 
spot,” or if students believe that legal training enables lawyers to better monitor 
and control for biases and stereotypes. In either case, the survey results suggest 
that law students would benefit from exposure to social cognition theory45 to 
help understand how deeply rooted our biases are, and to dispel the belief that 
legal training in rational and “objective” thinking trumps lifelong cognitive 
processes. 
II. SOCIAL COGNITION THEORY AND THE FALLIBILITY OF OBJECTIVITY 
Social cognition theory tells us that we all have stereotypes, biases, and 
prejudices that affect our perceptions and interactions.46 Inundated with stimuli 
and information, our brains use heuristics (mental shortcuts) and schema 
(groupings of information) to process information efficiently.47 Stereotypes are 
cognitive schema in which we group people based upon our experiences as well 
as information from friends, family, neighborhoods, the media, etc.48 At its 
core, a stereotype “is a faulty generalization about a group or its members.”49 
Biases and prejudices are generally defined as attitudes based upon applying 
stereotypes to individuals or social groups,50 and the terms are often used inter-
                                                        
45  Others have suggested exposing law students to social cognition theory to help them bet-
ter understand issues that may arise in cross-cultural lawyer/client communications. See, e.g., 
Lawrence M. Solan, Four Reasons to Teach Psychology to Legal Writing Students, 22 J.L. & 
POL’Y 7 (2013); Weng, supra note 18, at 391. The survey results set forth in this article pro-
vide hard evidence of the need to do so.  
46  Michelle R. Gomez, The Next Generation of Disparate Treatment: A Merger of Law and 
Social Science, 32 REV. LITIG. 553, 568–69 (2013). 
47  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Govern-
ment Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 555–56 (2002). 
48  Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize 
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 324 (2012). 
49  Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation 
in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1908 (2009). 
50  See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 
57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829, 829 (2001) [hereinafter Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice] (defining 
prejudice as “an unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be a 
member of that group”); Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation De-
mands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 384 (2008) (adopting Dovidio’s 
definition); see also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmak-
ers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 742 (1995) (noting that prejudice 
“consists of derogatory personal beliefs”). But see Bartlett, supra note 49 (noting that social 
scientists describe biases and prejudices as “positive or negative attitude that can attach to a 
stereotype”) (emphasis added). Cognitive bias has been described as, “the use of categories 
that are themselves shaped or contaminated by confining stereotypes and habitual ways of 
thinking about nondominant groups in our society.” Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of 
Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 467 (1998). 
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changeably.51 The reason we may be unaware of our stereotypes, biases, and 
prejudices is because they become embedded in our subconscious from an early 
age. 
A. Stereotypes and Bias: The Early Beginnings 
Stereotype schemas begin at a very young age as infants and toddlers begin 
to categorize people based upon easily observable characteristics such as skin 
color, gender, age, etc.52 Professor Jody Armour describes stereotypes as the 
“well-learned sets of associations among groups and traits established in chil-
dren’s memories at an early age, before they have the cognitive skills to decide 
rationally upon the personal acceptability of the stereotypes.”53 For example, 
studies show that racial stereotypes are in place before children enter kindergar-
ten.54 Stereotypes become so internalized that simply seeing someone from a 
particular social group can prime and activate stereotypes for that group.55 
Rozas and Miller discuss a model, the “cycle of socialization,” that explains 
how “people enter a world in which their social identity (race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) influences what they are taught, how they 
                                                        
51  As Professor Mahzarin Banaji, one of the principle investigators of implicit bias theory, 
notes, the terms “bias” and “prejudice” are often used interchangeably. See Transcript of 
Motion: Evidentiary Hearing at 477, New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254, 2008 WL 
2675622 (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2008); see also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and 
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 1359, 1360 n.8 (noting that “bias” and “prejudice” are used interchangeably). The terms 
also are often used in conjunction with each other. A February 2015 Westlaw search of sec-
ondary sources resulted in over eight thousand articles using the phrase “bias or prejudice”. 
This article follows the convention of using the terms bias and prejudice interchangeably and 
in conjunction with each other. 
52  Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1999) (not-
ing that “[e]vidence suggests that race, gender, age, and other characteristics are among the 
first perceived and associated with specific encounters”). 
53  Armour, supra note 50, at 741. 
54  Leland Ware, “Color Struck”: Intragroup and Cross-Racial Color Discrimination, 13 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 75, 107–08 (2013) (discussing studies of children ages three to five con-
necting positive adjectives to white faces and negative adjectives to black faces). In an oft-
cited 1947 study, researchers found that in the United States, children learn as early as age 
three to devalue people with dark skin color. Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial 
Identification and Preference in Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169 
(Theodore M. Newcomb & Eugene L. Hartley eds., 1947) (presenting young African Ameri-
can children with light skinned and dark skinned dolls and finding the children preferred the 
white-colored dolls). A recent preliminary study suggests that this preference for lighter skin 
remains present in children today. See Study: White and Black Children Biased Toward 
Lighter Skin, CNN (May 14, 2010, 4:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/13/doll.study/. 
55  Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise 
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 798–800 (2012) (describing studies 
showing how quickly stereotypes, especially racial stereotypes, can be primed and activat-
ed). 
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are treated, and to what information and opportunities they are exposed.”56 
They note that those in whom children place their trust (parents, teachers, fami-
ly, friends) normalize stereotypes, biases, prejudices, and understandings of the 
world based upon cultural identities.57 Through this social acculturation, rac-
ism58 and other forms of social oppression become embedded into both the in-
dividual and collective unconscious.59  
B. Repression and Aversive Racism 
While most people, or at least most law students, presumably recognize 
that acting based upon biases and stereotypes is socially unacceptable,60 not to 
mention often illegal,61 that does not mean it doesn’t happen. What does hap-
pen is that people tend to either repress or deny the existence of stereotypical 
thoughts or behaviors,62 and thus think that they are not acting upon them. 
People have biases that may relate to race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sex-
ual orientation, age, disability, etc., many of which exist on a subconscious lev-
el.63 Presumably, most law students would like to think of themselves as low 
                                                        
56  Lisa Werkmeister Rozas & Joshua Miller, Discourses for Social Justice Education: The 
Web of Racism and the Web of Resistance, 18 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN SOCIAL 
WORK 24, 29 (2009). 
57  Id. 
58  Racism is different than individual prejudices. Professor John F. Dovidio notes that rac-
ism “involves a widely accepted racist ideology and the power to deny other racial groups 
the ‘dignity, opportunities, freedoms, and rewards’ that are available to one’s own group 
through ‘a socially organized set of ideas, attitudes, and practices.’ ” Dovidio, Contemporary 
Prejudice, supra note 50 (quoting JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNÁN VEGA, WHITE RACISM: THE 
BASICS (1995)). 
59  Rozas & Miller, supra note 56. 
60  Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1359, 1386 (2008) (noting that “even highly prejudiced people usually know that open dis-
plays of bias are considered unacceptable”). While there is a social stigma attached to openly 
endorsing negative stereotypes, that same stigma does not necessarily exist for positive ste-
reotypes even though positive stereotypes may be as harmful as their negative counterparts. 
See Aaron C. Kay et al., The Insidious (and Ironic) Effects of Positive Stereotypes, 49 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (2013) (discussing why positive stereotypes are harmful). 
61  Demonstrating an employer acted based upon stereotypes can help establish a violation of 
Title VII’s prohibition against unlawful employment actions. For a discussion of the role ste-
reotypes play in plaintiffs’ Title VII discrimination claims, see Kerry Lynn Stone, Clarifying 
Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591 (2011) (discussing the development and application of 
evidence of stereotyping as evidence of unlawful employment practices). 
62  Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987) (noting that as our culture has rejected rac-
ism as immoral and unproductive, people feel compelled to hide their prejudices). This re-
pression of biases and prejudices by well-meaning people, and especially white people, lays 
at the heart of studies on aversive racism. See, e.g., Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra 
note 50, at 833–35 (describing studies that indicate how people who endorse egalitarian 
views do not discriminate directly but often do so unconsciously, especially when their be-
havior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than race). 
63  The existence of these subconscious biases have been confirmed by Implicit Association 
Tests (“IAT”). For a discussion of implicit association tests, see infra Part II.C. For a discus-
sion of some of the biases measured by IATs, see, e.g., Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Re-
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prejudiced people (i.e., people who do not endorse or accept the content of neg-
ative racial or other cultural stereotypes).64 While the survey did not ask ques-
tions that would indicate whether students endorsed negative cultural stereo-
types, it did ask students if they could identify when they were acting based 
upon stereotypes and culturally biased assumptions, and whether they believed 
that they looked at the legal system through a culturally biased lens.65 Their re-
sponses indicate that many law students believe they are cognizant of their bi-
ases, and that they are less likely than other people, and particularly less likely 
than clients, to look at legal problems through a culturally biased lens.66 What 
students may not recognize is that stereotypes and biases operate on a subcon-
scious basis. Because we live in a society in which racial, gender, religious, and 
other biases are woven into the fabric of our culture, “consciously biased peo-
ple (‘high-prejudiced people’) and those who espouse more egalitarian views 
(‘low-prejudiced people’) demonstrate equal activation of societal stereotypes 
under conditions when no time exists for personal beliefs to interfere with the 
unconscious automatic response.”67  
One of the most studied subconscious biases relates to race.68 Looking at 
racial biases between whites and blacks, Professors Gaertner and Dovidio 
coined the term “aversive racists” to describe white people who consciously 
endorse egalitarian views yet have negative racial feelings and beliefs (often 
formed through their socialization processes).69 Aversive racists are either un-
                                                                                                                                
visited, supra note 6, at 957 (noting that an analysis of tens of thousands of implicit associa-
tion tests “found that eighty-eight percent of white people had a pro-white or anti-black im-
plicit bias; nearly eighty-three percent of heterosexuals showed implicit bias for straight 
people over gays and lesbians; and more than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim testers 
displayed implicit biases against Arab Muslims”); see also Mark Deal, Aversive Disablism: 
Subtle Prejudice Toward Disabled People, 22 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 93 (2007) (discussing 
implicit biases against disabled people); Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit 
Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 
(2010) (discussing the development of implicit association tests to measure gender bias in 
the legal profession). 
64  Armour, supra note 50. 
65  Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. A. 
66  See supra Tables 1, 2, 4, 5. 
67  Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified 
Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 919 (1999) 
(citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989)). The automatic activation of 
stereotypes when decision making occurs quickly is also discussed by Professor Dovidio in 
his work on aversive racism. See Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 840. 
68  See, e.g., Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, 840–45 (discussing various 
studies testing the relationship between unconscious racial biases and people’s behaviors); 
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misre-
membering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 353–63 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equal-
ity] (discussing numerous and wide-ranging studies identifying and discussing implicit racial 
biases). 
69  Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 835. Aversive racists are distin-
guished from those who openly express bigoted views—those people are coined “old-
fashioned, or dominative racists”. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding 
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aware of their negative racial beliefs or deny their existence because those be-
liefs are incompatible with their egalitarian self-images.70 Aversive racists will 
not discriminate overtly, but “will discriminate, often unintentionally, when 
their behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than race (e.g., 
questionable qualifications for a position).”71 The studies on aversive racism 
indicated a significant difference in results between people’s self-reports about 
bias and prejudice, and patterns of (often unconscious) subtle discrimination.72 
Aversive racism theories were built upon observations of people’s conduct, as 
compared to their self-reports about prejudice.73 As discussed in the next sec-
tion, eventually these observations were confirmed via computer technology. 
C. Implicit Association Tests Confirm the Existence of Unconscious Biases 
Because the desire to answer in a socially acceptable manner combined 
with the subconscious operation of biases result in unreliable self-reports, cog-
nitive and social psychologists developed numerous tests of bias that rely on 
physiological indicators, rather than self-reports.74 One of the most widely 
known and validated75 of these is the implicit association test (“IAT”). Devel-
oped over twenty years ago by Professors Greenwald and Banaji,76 this test in-
dicates a significant portion of Americans have biases based upon a wide range 
of cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, and sexual ori-
                                                                                                                                
and Addressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 615, 623 (2005). 
70  Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 835. 
71  Id. An example of how aversive racism manifests can be found in a 1998 study by Profes-
sors Dovidio and Gaertner. In that study, employers were presented with candidates with 
identical credentials. When candidates were equally qualified or unqualified, there was little 
difference in which candidate was recommended for the job. However, when qualifications 
were more ambiguous, white study participants recommended the black candidate signifi-
cantly less often. The authors suggest this finding indicates that white participants tended to 
give white, but not black, job candidates the “benefit of the doubt.” Id. at 836–38. 
72  Id. at 838; see also Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817 (2004) (discussing findings that people try to mask bi-
ased decision making in employment and admissions decisions by engaging in casuistry—
i.e. they find an unbiased justification for a biased decision, such as inflating their preferred 
candidates’ qualifications over those of competitors). 
73  Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 834–45 (discussing studies that 
demonstrate the existence of aversive racism amongst those who self-reported egalitarian 
attitudes). 
74  Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 471 (2010) (citing to a wide range of physiological tests that have 
been developed to assess bias). 
75  Id. at 488–89 (discussing IAT validity studies); see also Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit 
Association Test: Validity Debates, http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm (last 
visited May 3, 2015) (listing links to numerous IAT validity studies). 
76  Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995). 
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entation.77 The test operates upon the premise that it takes slightly longer for an 
unconsciously biased person to connect positive descriptive words with a 
member of a disfavored group.78 Not only does the test uncover unconscious or 
hidden biases (implicit biases), it also demonstrates that implicit bias differs 
from explicitly expressed attitudes. “Even those who consciously renounce 
prejudice have been shown to have implicit or automatic biases that conflict 
with their nonprejudiced values . . . .”79 
Well-meaning white people are not the only people who harbor uncon-
scious biases. In our survey, nonwhite students thought white lawyers were 
more likely than lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities to bring cul-
turally biased assumptions into the lawyer/client relationship.80 Results from 
the IAT test suggest that while that may be true, membership in a group that is 
subjected to biases and stereotypes does not protect one against subconscious 
endorsement of those stereotypes. For example, the IAT race test found that 88 
percent of those self-identifying as white had a pro-white bias while 48 percent 
of those self-identifying as black showed a pro-white or anti-black bias.81 The 
IAT tests also found that women, as well as men, displayed implicit gender ste-
reotypes.82 The IAT provides evidence that biases are pervasive and may affect 
even those harmed by the biases. 
D. Implicit Bias, Confirmation Bias, and Lawyering 
1. Implicit Bias 
While the IAT tests do not claim that those with implicit biases consistent-
ly act upon them, there is substantial evidence that racial and ethnic stereotypes 
and biases affect our perceptions, interactions, and behaviors, often without our 
awareness.83 For example, studies indicate that our biases may affect our eye 
                                                        
77  For a list of the available IAT tests, see PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html (last visited June 4, 2015). 
78  Pollard, supra note 67, at 918. For a detailed and yet easily comprehensible explanation 
of how the test works, see MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: 
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 32–52 (2013) [hereinafter BANAJI & GREENWALD, 
BLINDSPOT]. 
79  Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They? In-
troduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757, 757 (2001); see 
also Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 840 (noting that implicit attitudes 
predict nonverbal behaviors while explicit attitudes predict verbal or deliberative and con-
trolled actions). 
80  Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. D at 243. 
81  Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6, at 957 (noting that “victims of 
white supremacy often internalize racial bias directed against them”). 
82  Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 68, at 361 (discussing findings that 
group membership does not insulate one from bias about that group, such as studies finding 
both women and men displayed implicit gender stereotypes; and both young and old people 
have a preference for young over old). 
83  BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78, at 46–52 (discussing studies showing 
correlations between implicit biases and racially discriminatory behaviors). 
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contact, seating distance, and how frequently we smile when interviewing cli-
ents and witnesses.84 Thus, our biases can affect our lawyer/client relationships, 
and our relationships with colleagues and judges, even when we are unaware 
that they are doing so.85 Because implicit biases manifest via nonverbal cues, 
those that are the target of the biases are aware that the person with whom they 
are interacting has biases, even if the person believes he or she is acting in a bi-
as-free manner.86 This difference in perception can have a negative impact on 
interactions, can interfere with the ability to work effectively together,87 and 
can perpetuate inequalities.88 For example, in a study of teamwork effective-
ness amongst college students, interracial teams with aversive racists were the 
least efficient—even less efficient than those with self-identified prejudiced 
white team members.89 To the extent implicit racial attitudes are manifested 
through nonverbal behavior and detected by people of color, those unconscious 
biases can affect the group dynamic and impede the group’s overall perfor-
mance.90  
Studies also show that it does not take much to “prime” stereotypes and, 
once activated, these stereotypes can play a role in decision making. For exam-
ple, when study participants listened to rap music, they rated a black person’s 
behavior as less intelligent and more hostile than when they listened to pop mu-
sic.91 Changing the skin tone of a perpetrator in a security camera photo affect-
ed the way people judged ambiguous trial evidence.92 Implicit bias can even 
                                                        
84  Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1171 (2008) 
(noting that “studies have shown that white people high in implicit bias toward blacks smiled 
less frequently, created greater physical distance, and displayed stiffness with their body lan-
guage during interactions with a black person, and spent less time conversing, as compared 
to interactions with a white person”). 
85  For a discussion of how implicit biases affect lawyer hiring and promotion decisions and 
legal workplace dynamics, see Professor Negowetti’s thoughtful article in this symposium 
issue. Nicole E. Negowetti, Implicit Bias and the Legal Profession’s “Diversity Crisis”: A 
Call for Self-Reflection, 15 NEV. L.J. 930 (2015). 
86  Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 842–43. 
87  Id. at 845. 
88  Id.; see also Negowetti, supra note 85, at 942–45 (discussing the negative impact implicit 
biases can have on law firm work assignments and the other workplace opportunities availa-
ble to women and people of color as compared to their male or white counterparts). 
89  Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 844–45. These attitudes can also 
negatively impact job performance. Professor Dovidio concludes: 
To the extent that Blacks are in the minority in an organization and are dependent on highly 
prejudiced Whites or aversive racists on work-related tasks, their performance is likely to be ob-
jectively poorer than the performance of Whites who predominantly interact with other Whites. 
Thus, even when Whites harbor unconscious and unintentional biases toward Blacks, their ac-
tions can have effects, sometimes even more detrimental than those of old-fashioned racists, on 
the outcomes and ultimately on the wellbeing of Blacks. 
Id. at 845. 
90  Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 844. 
91  Smith & Levinson, supra note 55, at 799 (describing a study in which participants be-
lieved they were participating in a marketing study and were asked to listen to music for thir-
teen minutes). 
92  Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Ra-
cial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 331–39 (2010) 
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affect how one remembers facts. One study indicates that changing the race of 
an assailant in an assault case resulted in jurors misremembering facts in racial-
ly biased ways.93 
Legal training in rational and analytical thinking does not immunize one 
from having and acting upon biases. A study found implicitly biased racial atti-
tudes amongst capital defense lawyers—lawyers one might assume would be 
least likely to harbor biases and racialized attitudes.94 Nor is the judiciary im-
mune from implicit biases.95 One study demonstrates that judges, like everyone 
else, have implicit biases that affect their perceptions and decision making.96 
During a judicial education conference, Professor Rachlinski and colleagues 
recruited 133 judges from three jurisdictions to participate in a study.97 The 
judges took the IAT race bias test and also analyzed three different fact scenar-
ios to answer questions about conviction, sentencing, and likelihood of recidi-
vism.98 The IAT test results indicated that the judges, like others, harbor im-
plicit racial biases.99 The response to questions about the various factual 
scenarios also indicated that lack of awareness of the biases may affect the ju-
dicial decision-making processes and judgments.100  
2. Confirmation Bias 
Implicit bias is only one of the biases that operate subconsciously.101 An-
other powerful subconscious bias, and one that has implications for lawyers and 
law practice, is confirmation bias. Confirmation bias has been defined as “the 
tendency to seek out evidence consistent with one’s views, and to ignore, dis-
                                                                                                                                
(finding that participants evaluated evidence differently based upon the skin tone of the per-
petrator). 
93  Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 68, at 390–406 (discussing findings that 
mock jurors more accurately remember facts supporting the defendant’s aggressive behavior 
when the defendant is black than when the defendant is white). 
94  Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty 
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004). 
95  See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: 
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010) (discussing one judge’s dismay at dis-
covering he harbored implicit biases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial 
Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (discussing a study in which 
a significant percentage of white judges demonstrated a white preference on the IAT). 
96  Rachlinski et al., supra note 95, at 1197. 
97  Id. at 1205. 
98  Id. at 1214–19. 
99  Id. at 1221. 
100  Interestingly, the study suggested that when made aware of biases and motivated to con-
trol for them, judges were able to do so. Id. 
101  A discussion of the numerous biases that may affect perception and judgment is outside 
the scope of this article. For a discussion of the various biases that give rise to “bias blind 
spot,” see generally Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judg-
ment, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2006) [hereinafter Pronin, Perception and Misper-
ception]. 
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miss, or selectively reinterpret evidence that contradicts them.”102 Confirmation 
bias explains how our unconscious perceptions affect our evaluations of people 
and evidence.103 
A recent study illustrates how confirmation bias may come into play in the 
legal workplace.104 Five partners from different law firms deliberately inserted 
grammatical, factual and analytical errors in a legal research memo about trade 
secrets in internet start-ups.105 The memo then was analyzed by fifty-three dif-
ferent law firm partners who agreed to participate in a study on “writing com-
petencies of young attorneys.”106 The partners were asked to edit the memo for 
all factual, technical, and substantive errors and to rate the memo’s overall 
quality.107 The partners received the same memo, with a cover page indicating 
the memo was drafted by a male third-year associate who graduated from NYU 
Law School. Half were told the associate was “Caucasian,” and the other half 
were told the associate was “African American.”108 
The identical memo averaged statistically significant lower overall ratings 
for the African American associate (3.2/5.0) versus the Caucasian associate 
(4.1/5.0).109 More errors were found in the memo written by the African Amer-
ican associate,110 and the qualitative comments were more negative for the Af-
rican American “writer.”111 Based upon these data, the study authors concluded 
that confirmation bias played a role in the study results. They noted that 
“[w]hen expecting to find more errors, we find more errors.”112 The combina-
tion of unconscious biases about writing abilities of African American lawyers 
and confirmation bias produced an “objective” evaluation that scored an Afri-
can American associate much more poorly than his Caucasian counterpart for 
exactly the same work product.113 
A similar finding—that implicit bias and confirmation bias were at play in 
associates’ evaluations—was seen in another study the same authors conducted. 
In one law firm, minority summer associates were consistently being evaluated 
                                                        
102  Scott O. Lilienfeld et al., Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research on Cor-
recting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 390, 391 
(2009). 
103  See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) (explaining confirmation bias and how it 
manifests). 
104  ARIN N. REEVES, NEXTIONS, YELLOW PAPER SERIES 2014-0404, WRITTEN IN BLACK  
& WHITE: EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING  
SKILLS, NEXTIONS (2014), available at http://www.nextions.com/wp-content/files_mf 
/14151940752014040114WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS.pdf 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
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more negatively than their majority counterparts. To test whether those evalua-
tions were accurate, the firm developed a blind grading system for a couple of 
assignments.114 Comparing the “blindly graded” assignments to the summer as-
sociates’ other assessments, the law firm found that the blind evaluations were 
generally more positive for minorities and women than their other assessments. 
The opposite was true for white men—their blindly graded assessments were 
generally less positive than their other assessments.115 These studies provide 
additional evidence that unconscious biases affect how lawyers “objectively” 
evaluate evidence and performance.116 
III. SELF-AWARENESS, SOCIAL COGNITION THEORY, AND  
RESISTANCE TO MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 
A. Bias Blind Spot and Multicultural Education 
Social cognition theory teaches us that not only do most people have un-
conscious biases, they also have a “bias blind spot” (i.e. people tend to believe 
that while others are relatively susceptible to bias, they are relatively bias-
free).117 People over-estimate their ability to control their judgments and feel-
ings,118 and even when they know they are using biased processes to make de-
cisions, they believe their decisions are “objective” and untainted by bias.119  
                                                        
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  As Professor Negowetti aptly points out, failure to recognize the impact of implicit bias 
on legal workplace dynamics and evaluations may be one reason for the persistent lack of 
diversity seen in major law firms across the country. Negowetti, supra note 85, at 934–35 
(discussing lack of diversity at large law firms); id. at 945–49 (discussing the role implicit 
bias may play in law firm evaluations of associates’ performance). 
117  Pronin, Perception and Misperception, supra note 101, at 37–38 (discussing the wide 
range of biases and people’s tendencies to believe others have biases while they are immune 
to them); Emily Pronin & Kathleen Schmidt, Claims and Denials of Bias and Their Implica-
tions for Policy, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 195, 196–97 (Eldar Shafir ed., 
2013) (listing the various research that supports evidence of bias blind spot in various cogni-
tive and motivational biases); Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: Peo-
ple’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 680 (2005) (discussing how people generally have a bias “blind spot” when it comes 
to identifying their own biases and discussing studies which demonstrate that people are less 
likely to think they are guilty of bias in a specific instance than in the abstract, and that peo-
ple tend to believe that their personal connection to an issue makes them less likely to be bi-
ased but that others’ personal connections makes them more likely to be biased). See gener-
ally BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78. 
118  Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: 
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 125–26 
(1994) (discussing how their studies suggest that people underestimate their own susceptibil-
ity to bias and overestimate their ability to control their own thoughts and feelings). 
119  See generally Katherine Hansen et al., People Claim Objectivity After Knowingly Using 
Biased Strategies, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691 (2014). 
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Like the students in our survey,120 people also tend to think they are better 
than others when it comes to recognizing when they are acting based upon bi-
ases and stereotypes.121 In answering the question “why do people tend to see 
bias in others while being blind to it in themselves,” Emily Pronin and Mathew 
Kugler attribute this tendency, at least in part, to what they call the “introspec-
tion illusion.”122 They found that when judging bias, people tended to judge 
others’ biases by looking at others’ behavior, but to judge their own biases by 
looking introspectively at their own thoughts and feelings.123 People tend to be 
unaware of the limitations of their own introspections, thus they over-value 
their ability to accurately assess when they are acting based upon biases (i.e. 
they are unaware that bias generally manifests unconsciously and thus, intro-
spection does not yield evidence of bias).124 One way that researchers have 
found to counteract this “bias blind spot” is to provide students with studies 
about: 1) subconscious influences on attitudes and behaviors; 2) the failure of 
introspection to access what occurs in our minds on an unconscious level; and 
3) people’s lack of awareness regarding when they have been unintentionally 
influenced.125 This exposure reduces students’ susceptibility to bias blind spot 
(i.e. after reading an article about these studies, students were less likely to 
“claim objectivity” in their own judgments while “imputing bias” to others).126 
This finding has implications for legal educators who encourage self-
reflection as a methodology that helps students develop their cultural sensibility 
skills.127 To the extent law students fall prey to “introspection illusion,” their 
                                                        
120  See supra Table 5. 
121  See generally Ehrlinger et al., supra note 117; Pronin, Perception and Misperception, 
supra note 101; Emily Pronin, How We See Ourselves and How We See Others, 320 SCIENCE 
1177 (2008); Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 
28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., 369 (2002). 
122  Emily Pronin and Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Intro-
spection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 
566 (2007). 
123  Id. at 570. 
124  Id. at 571. 
125  Id. at 574–75. 
126  Id. at 575. 
127  Many advocate self-reflection as a key component of multicultural education. See, e.g., 
Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 
CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 64–78 (2001) (discussing the need for law students to engage in self-
reflection and explaining how self-reflection plays a part in various aspects of developing 
“habits” that lead to effective intercultural lawyering); Antoinette Sedillo López, Making and 
Breaking Habits: Teaching (and Learning) Cultural Context, Self-Awareness, and Intercul-
tural Communication Through Case Supervision in a Client-Service Legal Clinic, 28 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 47 (2008) (arguing for the need to develop students’ self-awareness 
about the role their own cultural perspectives play in lawyer/client interactions); see also 
Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along: Interpersonal Biases & Interracial Distrust, 8 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 100 (2002) (suggesting that over-
coming ingrained racial attitudes requires actively engaging in self-reflection); Paul R. 
Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 373, 410–11 (2002) (discussing how social workers and counselors are taught about 
the need for self-reflection as a skill necessary for intercultural counseling). 
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self-reflection without exposure to social cognition theory literature may actu-
ally be counter-productive. It may simply entrench students’ belief that they are 
“objective”128 while others are biased. It appears that for introspection to make 
inroads into students’ awareness of their biases, that introspection should be 
preceded with exposure to social cognition theory, including studies and litera-
ture about the existence of bias blind spot and the reasons it exists.  
B. Self-Awareness, Resistance, and Multicultural Education 
Exposure to social cognition theory about subconscious biases can help de-
stigmatize bias and encourage students to explore their own biases and the im-
pact those have upon the lawyering process.129 It provides students with a neu-
rological explanation for why legal analytical training is unlikely to trump a 
lifetime of subconscious cognitive processes. It also potentially addresses one 
reason law students might resist learning about the role culture plays in the 
lawyering process: their belief that they already recognize when they have, and 
are acting upon, stereotypical or culturally biased beliefs.130 Students may see 
no reason to learn about something they think they already understand,131 espe-
cially if they believe that their training in analytical “objective” analyses makes 
them less susceptible to operating from biases or stereotypes.132 Learning about 
social cognition theories such as implicit bias, aversive racism, confirmation 
bias, and bias blind spot may help eliminate resistance based upon students’ be-
liefs that they already have a solid grasp on how their own biases affect them.  
On the other hand, teaching students about the pervasiveness of uncon-
scious biases, even amongst well-meaning people, presents some risks. For ex-
ample, too much focus on the socialization that underlies the development of 
individuals’ subconscious cognitive biases may lead students to focus on bias 
                                                        
128  Belief in one’s own objectivity is itself problematic. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias 
in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012) (discussing study by Uhlmann and 
Cohen that demonstrates that when subjects were primed to feel objective, they were more 
likely to show gender-based discrimination when making a hypothetical hiring decision). 
129  Understanding the neurological processing that underlies subconscious biases and stereo-
types, and learning that even well-meaning people are not immune to that processing, can 
help de-stigmatize bias which, in turn, can lead to a willingness to admit to one’s own biases. 
Without recognition that bias exists, one cannot work to counter-act it. Jerry Kang, Trojan 
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1529 (2005) (noting that “to counter otherwise 
automatic behavior, one must accept the existence of the problem in the first place.”). 
130  See supra Tables 4, 5. 
131  Bryant, supra note 127, at 80 (noting that students may believe cross-cultural education 
is unnecessary for “progressive well-meaning” people). This attitude may carry over into the 
workplace and lead to a resistance to recognizing the need to address racial disparity within 
the legal workplace. See Negowetti, supra note 85, at 953–54 (noting that, without education 
about the existence and impact of implicit biases, many white lawyers may resist, or at least 
fail to support, corrective actions designed to create more diverse legal workplaces). 
132  Bryant, supra note 127, at 61 (“Resistance occurs when students fail to see the relevance 
of cross-cultural instruction or ascribe greater value to learning other skills.”). Belief in one’s 
objectivity is not confined to law students. In fact, most people generally feel that their per-
ceptions, judgments, and opinions are objective. Pronin & Schmidt, supra note 117, at 200. 
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as an individual problem and ignore its institutional manifestations, and the fact 
that, as a society, we bear a collective responsibility to remedy the effects of 
that bias.133 Also, learning that unconscious biases are a result of our socializa-
tion runs the risk of normalizing bias and encouraging a “my culture made me 
do it” approach to dealing with issues in which biases surface.134 Exposure to 
social cognition theory also has the potential to increase, rather than decrease, 
some students’ resistance to multicultural education. The path to developing 
multicultural perspectives and understandings requires engaging in critical 
thinking about our cultural identities, power, and privilege.135 It challenges 
people to engage in self-exploration about their own biases and prejudices.136 
This self-exploration can engender anxiety and resistance because it threatens 
one’s sense of oneself and one’s place in society.137  
Many educators argue that developing students’ cross-cultural lawyering 
skills requires engaging students in a critical examination of how race, ethnici-
ty, sexual identity, socio-economic class, and other cultural factors have influ-
enced the law and legal systems in ways that have disempowered non-
European groups.138 For some students, this means they must re-examine their 
world views about merit and justice.139 Students may grapple with information 
that challenges their beliefs in meritocracy, social justice, and that they exist 
separate from, and uninfluenced by, the society around them.140 Discussion of 
                                                        
133  Professor Lawrence warns that normalizing bias can lead to denial of both individual and 
collective responsibility for ongoing behavior that “creates and perpetuates racial hierarchy” 
and which results in continued discrimination and inequality. Lawrence, Unconscious Rac-
ism Revisited, supra note 6, at 960–65. 
134  Eric Luis Uhlmann & Brian A. Nosek, My Culture Made Me Do It: Lay Theories of Re-
sponsibility for Automatic Prejudice, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. 108 (2012) (finding study partici-
pants often attributed their subconscious racial biases to their culture rather than accepting 
personal responsibility for their thoughts and actions). 
135  Kathleen Holtz Deal & Cheryl A. Hyde, Understanding MSW Student Anxiety and Re-
sistance to Multicultural Learning: A Developmental Perspective, 24 J. TEACHING SOC. 
WORK 73, 74 (2004). 
136  Jessica Jean Kastner, Beyond the Bench: Solutions to Reduce the Disproportionate Num-
ber of Minority Youth in the Family and Criminal Court Systems, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 941, 947 
(2007) (citing numerous scholars who argue that multicultural competence requires ac-
knowledging the existence of racism and white privilege which means confronting uncom-
fortable truths about ourselves and our society, especially for those of us who have enjoyed 
the privileges accorded to the dominant culture). 
137  Deal & Hyde, supra note 135. 
138  Archer, supra note 6, at 70 (arguing that teaching students about cultural differences is 
insufficient and that teachers must be willing to challenge students’ “post-racial beliefs and 
the way in which these beliefs help to perpetuate racism, inequality, and white-privilege”); 
Kastner, supra note 136 (noting that numerous educators believe that multicultural compe-
tency education requires discussion of racism and white privilege). 
139  Connie S. Chan & Mary Jane Treacy, Resistance in Multicultural Courses: Student, 
Faculty, and Classroom Dynamics, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 212, 213 (1996). 
140  Id. at 214; see also Beverly Daniel Tatum, Talking About Race, Learning About Racism: 
The Application of Racial Identity Development Theory in the Classroom, 62 HARV. EDUC. 
REV. 1, 6 (1992) (“An understanding of racism as a system of advantage presents a serious 
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issues involving oppression such as racism, classism, gender bias, ageism, anti-
Semitism, etc. often “generates powerful emotional responses in students that 
range from guilt and shame to anger and despair.”141 However, it is exploration 
of issues relating to race and ethnicity that tend to provoke the greatest re-
sistance, particularly amongst white students.142 It is challenging to raise issues 
of personal and structural bias and racism143 because the prevalent and domi-
nant discourse asserts that racism is a thing of the past and we now live in a 
“color-blind” society.144  
In a recent training about unconscious biases, one white man, after taking 
the IAT, was both aghast and disbelieving of the results. “How can this be?” he 
asked. “I have worked for [Congressman] John Lewis145 for the past ten 
years.”146 His response to the IAT results is not surprising or unexpected. 
Learning that one harbors unconscious biases can create a high level of discom-
fort when it conflicts with one’s belief that one operates from an unbiased, 
egalitarian viewpoint. The conflict between conscious thought processes and 
unconscious preferences can result in dissociation—“the occurrence, in one and 
                                                                                                                                
challenge to the notion of the United States as a just society where rewards are based solely 
on one’s merit.”). 
141  Tatum, supra note 140, at 1–2. 
142  Bridget Turner Kelly & Joy Gaston Gayles, Resistance to Racial/Ethnic Dialog in Grad-
uate Preparation Programs: Implications for Developing Multicultural Competence, 29 C. 
STUDENT AFF. J. 75, 79 (2010) (noting that in a study of graduate student preparation pro-
grams “[a]cross race, ethnicity, gender, and preparation programs, participants reported ex-
periencing resistance to discussing multicultural issues, primarily related to race/ethnicity”). 
See generally Tatum, supra note 140 (discussing resistance to learning about racism). 
143  Structural racism is a complex, dynamic system of conferring social benefits on some 
groups and imposing burdens on others that results in segregation, poverty, and denial of oppor-
tunity for millions of people of color. It comprises cultural beliefs, historical legacies, and insti-
tutional policies within and among public and private organizations that interweave to create 
drastic racial disparities in life outcomes. 
William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction, 100 
KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2011–12). 
144  See generally Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6 (discussing how 
the Supreme Court, and society in general, seeks to deny that race is a continuing factor in 
the institutional and structural inequalities that exist in the United States today); see also 
Archer, supra note 6, at 64–68 (discussing her law school clinic students’ belief that we live 
in a “post-racial” society which resulted in a reluctance to acknowledge the role racial dis-
crimination played in the inequalities their clients experienced); Curcio et al., Survey Instru-
ment, supra note 4, at app. D at 242 (indicating that most white students did not believe that 
experiences stemming from their racial or ethnic identities influenced their views of the U.S. 
legal system); Kelly & Gayles, supra note 142, at 77 (relaying a study finding that “students 
of color” reported thinking about their racial/ethnic background daily, whereas the white 
students reported that they thought of this “relatively infrequently”); Jean Koh Peters & Su-
san Bryant, Talking About Race, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 375, 380 (Susan Bryant et al. eds., 2014) 
(noting that some may believe that acknowledging difference or bias violates a commitment 
to equality, e.g. “I do not see black people, I just see people.”). 
145  Congressman Lewis is an African-American congressman who is one of this country’s 
most ardent civil rights and racial equality advocates. 
146  Conversation with Dr. Kimberly Jones, Decatur High School Counselor, (May 2014). 
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the same mind, of mutually inconsistent ideas that remain isolated from one 
another.”147 Discovery of one’s dissociative thoughts via IATs may produce 
cognitive dissonance—an uncomfortable mental state in which we become 
aware of conflicts between our beliefs and our actions or two simultaneously 
coexisting beliefs, a conflict which interferes with our desire for mental harmo-
ny.148 Because social cognition theory about subconscious biases may force 
students to confront unpleasant realities, exposure to it may trigger resistance to 
cross-cultural education efforts.149 
Student resistance, while not the only barrier to effective multicultural 
teaching,150 presents a significant barrier to learning. Student resistance mani-
fests in various ways. In some cases, students resist uncomfortable material via 
overt challenges to the material and/or professor. “Claims of course bias, re-
verse ‘victimization,’ and the ‘right’ to be provocative (e.g., make racist or sex-
ist comments) are strategies to distance oneself from what is perceived as ‘dan-
gerous’ material.”151 Students may challenge the accuracy of data and critique 
autobiographical accounts based upon their subjectivity.152 At the other end of 
the spectrum, students may passively resist learning via silence153 or attempting 
to shift the conversation to a “class not race” dialogue.154  
On one level, law professors should welcome resistance. Student questions 
and challenges indicate engagement with provocative material155—exactly the 
kind of learning atmosphere we hope to produce in our law classes. “[D]eep 
cognitive shifts that reflect knowledge integration” require learners to resist 
                                                        
147  BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78, at 57–58. 
148  Id. at 59; Elisabeth L. McFalls & Deirdre Cobb-Roberts, Reducing Resistance to Diversi-
ty Through Cognitive Dissonance Instruction: Implications for Teacher Education, 52 J. 
TEACHER EDUC. 164, 165 (2001) (discussing the dissonance that occurs when students in 
multicultural education courses are exposed to information inconsistent with their prior be-
liefs and experiences). 
149  BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78, at 59–60 (noting that people may be 
uncomfortable coming to terms with the IAT results, but finding that most people they en-
countered would rather know about their unconscious assumptions). 
150  For a discussion of additional barriers to multicultural teaching, see Khadija Khaja et al., 
Multicultural Teaching: Barriers and Recommendations, 21 J. ON EXCELLENCE C. TEACHING 
5 (2010) (discussing results of university wide survey asking 464 faculty members across 
disciplines about perceived barriers to multicultural teaching); see also Okianer Christian 
Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into 
Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 541, 557–60 (1996) (discussing challenges 
law faculty may confront when addressing diversity issues within the classroom). 
151  Deal & Hyde, supra note 135, at 75. 
152  Tatum, supra note 140, at 6. 
153  Deal & Hyde, supra note 135, at 76; Aja E. LaDuke, Resistance and Renegotiation: Pre-
service Teacher Interactions with and Reactions to Multicultural Education Course Content, 
MULTICULTURAL EDUC., Spring 2009, at 37, 39. 
154  LaDuke, supra note 153, at 40–41 (providing an example of how during discussions of 
white privilege as it relates to access to higher education students sought “to move analysis 
away from race, often on to issues of class and socioeconomic status.”). 
155  Chan & Treacy, supra note 139, at 214. 
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learning and their teachers to engage that resistance.156 That said, resistance can 
be a disruptive force.157 The following section briefly discusses how to address 
student resistance as well as other pedagogical issues.  
IV. SOCIAL COGNITION THEORY AND LAW SCHOOL  
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION PEDAGOGY 
A. Dealing with Student Resistance 
Many have written lengthy and thoughtful articles about the causes of stu-
dent resistance to multicultural learning, and potential remedies thereto.158 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide an in-depth review of 
suggestions for overcoming student resistance to diversity education, some 
common themes emerge. For example, teachers are encouraged to focus on the 
value of learning about how the most effective lawyers understand the role cul-
ture, and our own cultural biases, play in the lawyering process.159 To the ex-
tent students understand how biases affect one’s ability to represent clients and 
succeed in the workplace,160 they may be more open to exploring those bias-
                                                        
156  Jessica Berit Kindred, “8/18/97 Bite Me”: Resistance in Learning and Work, 6 MIND 
CULTURE & ACTIVITY 196, 198–99 (1999); see also Helen A. Moore, Student Resistance in 
Sociology Classrooms: Tools for Learning and Teaching, SOC. VIEWPOINTS, Fall 2007, at 29, 
38–39. 
157  Barbara Applebaum, Engaging Student Disengagement: Resistance or Disagreement?, 
2007 PHIL. EDUC. Y.B. 335, 337–39 (discussing the alienating effect on students of color 
when white students refuse to acknowledge social facts that are at odds with those students’ 
experiences). 
158  E.g., id. (identifying ways privileged students may resist learning and suggesting that 
students be told they do not need to adopt a particular viewpoint but do need to engage with 
course material that challenges their notions of themselves and society); Archer, supra note 6 
(discussing challenges of teaching students who believe we live in a “post-racial” society 
and suggesting that in addition to raising cultural issues in context of client representation, 
students should be “immersed” in the history, social science and context of racial discrimina-
tion); Dark, supra note 150 (discussing why it is important to raise diversity issues in law 
school classes and how to create a supportive and open classroom environment that makes it 
easier to do so); McFalls & Cobb-Roberts, supra note 148 (suggesting that resistance can be 
lowered by exposing students to cognitive dissonance theory); Peters & Bryant, supra note 
144 (discussing why students are resistant to talking about race and ways to work through 
that resistance); Tatum, supra note 140 (identifying sources of student resistance to talking 
about race and learning about racism and some strategies to overcome the resistance). 
159  Bryant, supra note 127, at 81 (discussing how when we help students understand the sig-
nificance of cultural similarities and differences and help them see how that understanding is 
critical to good lawyering, we lower student resistance to learning about the role their own, 
and others’ culture plays in the lawyering process); Dark, supra note 150, at 569 (emphasiz-
ing the need to connect diversity discussions with “legal theory, doctrine or practice.”); Kha-
ja, supra note 150, at 22 (suggesting that focusing on the value of learning and applying di-
verse viewpoints helps lower student resistance to multicultural learning). 
160  See supra Part II.D (discussing how unconscious biases affect legal representation and 
legal workplaces). For an in-depth discussion of how implicit biases help explain the lack of 
diversity in large law firms, especially at the partner level, see generally Negowetti, supra 
note 85. 
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es.161 Professors Peters and Bryant suggest that law teachers regularly ask the 
question: “what role does race play in our work” both to monitor individual bi-
ases and stereotypes and to raise consciousness about the role race plays in the 
development and application of legal rules and legal systems.162 Teachers also 
should create an atmosphere of open discussion and inquiry in which all stu-
dents understand that the professor is not asking them to endorse a particular 
viewpoint, but is asking them to be open to, and respectful of, different experi-
ences and viewpoints.163 Teachers also must become active listeners—
observing body language and listening to what is said and what is unsaid by 
both the speaker and the non-speakers—in order to address what is left un-
said.164 It has even been suggested that because people often experience cogni-
tive dissonance when they learn that their internal biases do not coincide with 
their conscious thought processes students should be exposed to the psycholog-
ical literature about cognitive dissonance.165 As teachers, we also likely will be 
more adept at understanding student resistance if we acknowledge our own bi-
ases and honestly grapple with the surprise and discomfort that causes us.166 
                                                        
161  While cultural self-awareness is a key component of culturally sensible lawyering, to be 
effective cross-cultural lawyers, students must also understand “the nature of racism and the 
impact that racial differences have on daily life.” Archer, supra note 6, at 69. Professor 
Archer suggests this understanding can be developed through deliberately teaching students 
“about the history, social science, and context of racial discrimination, themes that are for-
eign to many of them.” Id. at 72. 
162  Peters & Bryant, supra note 144, at 383. They also note that paying explicit attention to 
race is a way to counteract unconscious bias. Id. at 383–84. 
163  Chan & Treacy, supra note 139, at 217 (suggesting that if students understand that what 
counts is engagement with the material but not necessarily agreement with it, students will 
be less resistant); Dark, supra note 150, at 565–66 (arguing that law professors should con-
sistently encourage participation from all students during class discussions); Peters & Bry-
ant, supra note 144, at 381 (noting “that teachers must build an atmosphere of trust in which 
participants understand that they are learning together, and learning involves making mis-
takes and providing each other honest feedback about those mistakes”); Tatum, supra note 
140, at 18 (noting that the first step in creating a safe space for all students to speak requires 
“[e]stablishing the guidelines of confidentiality, mutual respect, ‘no zaps,’ and speaking 
from one’s own experience on the first day of class”). But see Applebaum, supra note 157 
(identifying the importance of not allowing class to be dominated by those who discount data 
about racism and racial injustice because when that happens, it further marginalizes already 
marginalized students); Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally 
Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 174 (2004) (noting that “[w]hile some students might consider a 
safe environment to be one in which people ‘do not get angry,’ or ‘raise their voices,’ others, 
particularly students of color, ‘may view this as an effort to squelch their expression of the 
angering experiences with racism that they have lived through and want to talk about’ ”). 
164  Dark, supra note 150, at 569–70. 
165  See generally McFalls & Cobb-Roberts, supra note 148 (discussing their study which 
indicates that exposure to cognitive dissonance literature helped some students understand 
their reactions to information that was inconsistent with their beliefs, opinion and experienc-
es and thus lowered their resistance to learning about diversity issues). 
166  See Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3 
FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219, 244 (2002) (noting that intercultural competency training only suc-
ceeds if “those of us who train lawyers confront our own humanity, our own racial demons, 
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Whatever instructional techniques are used, the key is to understand, and be 
prepared for, resistance, even amongst those who express a desire to learn 
about the role culture plays in the legal system.  
B. Introducing Social Cognition Theory During Orientation 
While not totally without risk, adding social cognition theory to multicul-
tural teaching provides perspective and a way for students to understand bias 
and its impact on lawyering. Exposure to social cognition theories such as aver-
sive racism,167 implicit bias as evidenced by the Implicit Association Tests,168 
bias blind spot,169 and confirmation bias170 can help students understand the 
pervasiveness of bias, even in well-meaning people. Exposure to studies of how 
these biases manifest in legal practice171 help students understand the relevance 
of learning about the role culture plays in the lawyering process. It also teaches 
them that their analytical training does not protect them from having, and act-
ing upon, subconscious biases.172  
Given the importance of developing lawyers equipped to work in today’s 
multicultural world, I suggest exposing students to social cognition theory as it 
relates to subconscious biases and their implication for lawyering during law 
school orientation, or shortly thereafter. To help students understand how im-
plicit biases both affect them as future lawyers, and play a role in the legal sys-
tem, students could be assigned selected reading about the impact of various 
subconscious biases on interactions and legal decision making.173 Students also 
should be made aware of the dangers of “bias blind spot” in order to improve 
their self-reflective abilities.174 Framing this education as an important compo-
                                                                                                                                
uncomfortable and messy as that may be”); Tatum, supra note 140, at 18 (suggesting that 
teachers speak from their own experiences); see also Seth Donal Hannah & Elizabeth Car-
penter-Song, Patrolling Your Blind Spots: Introspection and Public Catharsis in a Medical 
School Faculty Development Course to Reduce Unconscious Bias in Medicine, 37 CULTURE 
MED. & PSYCHIATRY 314 (2013) (recognizing that to be effective teachers, faculty must ex-
plore their own biases and discussing a medical school faculty development course designed 
to raise faculty’s awareness of their own subconscious biases). 
167  See supra Part II.B. 
168  See supra Part II.C. 
169  See supra Part III.A. 
170  See supra Part III.A. 
171  See supra Part II.D.2. 
172  See supra Part III.B. 
173  For example, Professor Banaji and Greenwald’s book provides a quick, digestible and 
comprehensive explanation of implicit bias, its manifestations in the justice system, and 
strategies for avoiding unintended discriminatory conduct. BANAJI & GREENWALD, 
BLINDSPOT, supra note 78. 
174  See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing how exposure to studies about uncon-
scious biases eliminated the bias blind spot effect). Of course, exposure during orientation to 
social cognition theory is unlikely to result in a long-term change in students’ decision-
making processes. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 102, at 393 (noting that some argue that in-
struction alone cannot combat subconscious biases); Kang, supra note 129, at 1528–35 (sug-
gesting that it is difficult or even impossible, to eliminate completely the effects of implicit 
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nent of effective lawyering175 explains both why it is a part of their law school 
orientation, and potentially lessens student resistance to what, for many of 
them, may be new and challenging concepts.176 
Assigning reading that exposes students to social cognition literature as it 
relates to biases during orientation sends the message that “thinking like a law-
yer” means considering the role cultural biases have played, and continue to 
play, in legal representation. Introducing the topic in orientation helps set the 
stage for ongoing discussions in a wide range of law school courses, and it in-
creases students’ awareness that lawyers, just like clients, are influenced by 
their cultural biases and stereotypes.  
C. Teaching Techniques Based upon Social Cognition Theory Studies 
Once the stage is set during orientation, faculty may raise issues of both 
explicit and implicit bias in the ways that are best suited to the class and the 
professor’s teaching style. While it is outside the scope of this article to engage 
in an in-depth exploration of ways to raise students’ awareness of both implicit 
and explicit racial and other cultural biases in judicial decision making as well 
as their own analyses, the following are just a few of the multiple opportunities 
to raise these issues throughout the curriculum.177 In civil procedure, the semi-
nal case of Iqbal v. Ashcroft178 can be used to introduce students to the role im-
plicit biases based upon racial and ethnic stereotypes may have on judicial de-
cision-making.179 Later in the course, showing the video in Scott v. Harris180 
                                                                                                                                
bias). But see Rachlinski et al., supra note 95 at 1221 (finding that judges’ conscious aware-
ness of implicit racial bias helped change their decision-making processes). 
175  See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing how cultural biases impact lawyering) and Part II.D.2 
(discussing how biases impact employer evaluations). 
176  See supra Part IV.A. 
177  For an example of how to integrate cultural sensibility education into doctrinal courses, 
see ANTHONY O’DONNELL & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, DEVELOPING A CROSS-CULTURAL LAW 
CURRICULUM (1997) (suggesting numerous ways to integrate discussions of the influence 
culture has on legal analysis and decision making in torts, property and equity courses). For 
additional suggestions, see Mary A. Lynch et al., Teaching the Newly Essential Knowledge, 
Skills, and Values in a Changing World, in BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (Deborah Maranville et al. eds.) (forthcoming 
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2558863. For a dis-
cussion of how to talk about race in a law school classroom, see generally Margalynne J. 
Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming 
Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635 (2008); Frank René Lopéz, Pedagogy 
on Teaching Race & Law: Beyond “Talk Show” Discussions, 10 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 39 
(2004); Peters & Bryant, supra note 144. 
178  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
179  See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to Measure 
Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187 (2013) (discussing a study that demonstrates in 
the post-Iqbal shift from notice pleading to a subjective plausibility pleading standard, the 
dismissal rates of black plaintiff’s claims has increased and there is a difference in pleading 
dismissals between white and black judges—a difference the author postulates may be at-
tributable to implicit racial bias). 
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and discussing why a young black man may be fleeing from the police in a sit-
uation in which white students would have likely pulled over presents another 
opportunity to discuss how rational decisions, and assessments of those deci-
sions, may be related to one’s cultural experiences. In family law, students can 
be asked to explore how cultural factors inform the development and analysis 
of the factors used to determine whether something is in the best interests of the 
child in all types of child placement decisions.181 In criminal law, understand-
ing the history of how the American government took American Indian chil-
dren away from their parents and placed them in institutions may help students 
understand why an American Indian mother did not bring her sick child to a 
government hospital.182 Clinical experiences also provide ripe ground for edu-
cating students about the role culture plays in the lawyer/client relationship and 
legal decision-making process.183 Legal writing classes are also a place where 
students can be taught to analyze the role culture and bias plays in legal analy-
sis.184  
                                                                                                                                
180  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). In Scott v. Harris, the police attempted to pull over 
Mr. Harris, a young African American man who was speeding. Mr. Harris, who was driving 
on a suspended license, decided not to stop because he was afraid of going to jail. Mr. Harris 
initiated a high-speed car chase. To end the chase, Deputy Scott rammed Harris’s car with 
the police cruiser. Harris crashed. As a result of the crash, Harris became a quadriplegic. 
Harris sued Scott alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using ex-
cessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity—a claim the Supreme Court upheld. A vid-
eo in which both Mr. Harris and Deputy Scott discuss what happened is available at vik2k3, 
Why I Ran., YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JATVLUOjzvM. 
181  Professor Tanya Washington, a colleague at Georgia State University College of Law, 
uses this idea in her family law class. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see generally 
Cynthia R. Mabry, The Browning of America—Multicultural and Bicultural Families in 
Conflict: Making Culture a Customary Factor for Consideration in Child Custody Disputes, 
16 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 413 (2010). 
182  Professor Nirej Sekhon, a colleague who teaches criminal law, engages his first year 
criminal law students in this discussion based upon the case of State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 
1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). For a discussion of that case and the cultural underpinnings of 
the parents’ decision, see Megan H. Dearth, Comment, Defending the “Indefensible”: Re-
placing Ethnocentrism with a Native American Cultural Defense, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
621, 639–40 (2011). 
183  Numerous clinical legal educators have discussed both the importance of educating their 
students about the role culture plays in the lawyering process and methods to do that. For a 
discussion of methodologies useful in teaching clinic students about the role culture plays in 
the lawyering process, see generally Susan Bryant and Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the 
Habits: Teaching about Identity, Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE 
EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note 
144. For additional thoughts on teaching clinic students, see Lisa Bliss et al., Client and Pa-
tient Relationships: Understanding Cultural and Social Context, in POVERTY, HEALTH AND 
LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 125, 147 (Elizabeth Tobin 
Tyler et al. eds., 2011); López, supra note 127; see also Archer, supra note 6, (discussing the 
importance of facilitating clinic students’ understanding of the existence and implications of 
racism as well as other cultural factors in order to best equip students to represent effectively 
their clients). 
184  See, e.g., Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)examined Assumptions and 
(Un)intended Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Lan-
guage, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2003); Johanna K.P. Dennis, Ensuring a Multicultural Ed-
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Raising awareness of various cultural perspectives involved in legal deci-
sion making is actually a “de-biasing” technique. One study found that perspec-
tive taking (i.e. looking at the problem from someone else’s perspective) dimin-
ished the use of outgroup stereotypes.185 Another “de-biasing” teaching meth-
methodology involves asking students to “consider the opposite” and think 
about rival viewpoints or counterfactual outcomes. This teaching strategy also 
has been somewhat effective in countering confirmation and related biases.186 
“Perspective taking” and “consider the opposite” are teaching methodologies 
already familiar to many law professors. Providing students with a grounding in 
social cognition theory and using these familiar teaching methodologies across 
the curriculum hopefully will enhance students’ abilities to identify when their 
own, and others’, cultural and racial experiences, perspectives, and attitudes 
may influence factual or legal analyses, decisions about culpability, and deci-
sions about the most appropriate course of conduct.187  
CONCLUSION 
The survey data suggest that law students, like others, are subject to “bias 
blind spot,” both on a personal level and in their conceptions about lawyers. 
Students believe that they approach legal problems relatively bias-free, and that 
lawyers are less likely than clients to be affected by their cultural experiences 
and biases. As the social cognition studies discussed above indicate, it is un-
likely students accurately assess either their own, or lawyers’, susceptibility to 
subconscious biases. To remedy this deficiency, social cognition theory about 
unconscious biases should be amongst the many facets of cultural sensibility 
education, and this education should begin during orientation. Understanding 
subconscious biases, their pervasiveness, and their impact on perceptions, in-
teractions, and analyses, helps prepare lawyers to represent people from cultur-
al and racial backgrounds different from their own, and to address both indi-
vidual and institutional injustice.  
                                                                                                                                
ucational Experience in Legal Education: Start with the Legal Writing Classroom, 16 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 613 (2010). 
185  See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 102, at 393 (2009). Outgroup stereotypes are those stere-
otypes we attribute to people who do not belong to one of our socially constructed groups. 
Marcia L. McCormick, The Equality Paradise: Paradoxes of the Law’s Power to Advance 
Equality, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 515, 538–39 (2007) (“[I]ndividuals see members of 
their own group (the ingroup) as more like themselves, and others (the outgroup) as more 
different from themselves than they would without the group identity. People in a group are 
also much less able to see differences among members of the outgroup.” (footnote omitted)). 
186  See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 102, at 393. Some studies suggest that health care clini-
cians who took the time to consider alternative viewpoints and perspectives were less likely 
to make decisions based upon confirmation bias. Id. The same finding is likely to be true for 
lawyers and law clinic students. 
187  Archer, supra note 6, at 69–70 (noting that a cross-cultural lawyer must acknowledge 
how her own “attitude about race and racism may impact her interactions with her client, her 
examination of the legal and factual issues presented in the case, the course of action select-
ed, and the attribution of blame”). 
